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Abstract
Time-inconsistency can arise when a government attempts to convince private sector to use a
particular alternative energy (gas, green electricity...) rather than petroleum products. By
introducing taxes and feed-in prices, a government would encourage firms and households to
switch to an alternative energy rather than use petroleum products. However, even if a
government is in favor of increasing alternative energy consumption, it can benefit from
considerable financial resources resulting from petroleum product consumption. As a result
of these conflicting issues, the private sector may not find the alternative energy policy
credible, which prevents the government to implement a socially efficient policy.
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Over the last 25 years, various predictions have been made about crude oil supply.
It seems obvious that there is an increasing shortage of fossil fuels and, at the
same time, governments are faced with more demanding energy users with respect
to environmental protection. To deal with these crucial issues, governments have
to implement incentive tax policies in order to encourage ﬁrms and households to
switch to alternative energy sources (natural gas, wind or solar photovoltaic energy
or nuclear power). However, when government beneﬁts from considerable proceeds
from petroleum product taxes (which is the case for most European countries1),
implementing time-consistent policies remains a difﬁcult task.
A certain amount of time-inconsistency-related literature2 focuses on environ-
mental issues in order to deﬁne the credibility of coercive policies which are im-
posed on ﬁrms for making less polluting technology investments (Helm, Hepburn
and Mash (2004), Abrego and Perroni (2002), Marsiliani and Renström (2000)). For
instance, Abrego and Perroni (2002) consider environmental taxes aiming to reduce
pollution and related changing production methods which involve more research and
development work as well as new investments. However, these taxes can generate
unwanted distributional effects and, in the future, taxes may be reduced by the govern-
ment to minimize these impacts.
The present paper is related to the time inconsistency problem stemming from
incentive measures, such as tax credits, subsidies or feed-in prices, implemented for
supporting alternative energy instead of petroleum products consumption. Our aim
is not to emphasize the credibility of coercive measures. It is rather to understand
the difﬁculty for ﬁnal users to consider the government as a credible authority when
it promotes alternative energy. This situation is due to the government’s dilemma:
supporting alternative energies based on incentive policies or receiving large proceeds
from base energy taxes (mainly petroleum products). Even if the government prefers
to promote the use of alternative energies, it also considers the implications due to the
income loss resulting from a decreasing consumption of the base energy.
We develop a simple model of time-inconsistency in which only two sources
of energy are available to ﬁnal users: a base energy (petroleum) and an alternative
energy. A government implements an energy policy using taxes or subsidies in order
to increase the public’s energy consumption of alternative energy. In this context, we
show that such a policy is time-consistent provided that the tax differential between the
two energy sources is equal to the government preference for alternative energy. As a
result, when the government’s preference for alternative energy is lower than its base
energy tax, the only way to be credible consists in setting a positive tax on alternative
energy, but not giving subsidies. However, this situation involves a reduction in the tax
differential which may prevent an incentive from existing at all.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model
of time-inconsistent alternative energy policy. Section 3 ﬁrstly determines how the
government’s energy policy is an incentive policy, and then provides equilibrium
conditions under which this policy is time-consistent. Section 4 includes a discussion
of results when ﬁxing energy base tax. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1See International Energy Agency, 2000.
2Based on the founding works of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and Prescott (1977).
12 A model of time-inconsistent alternative energy policy
We consider an economy with two types of energy consumption, a base energy
(petroleum) and an alternative energy (as for instance wind turbine), respectively
denoted B and S. We develop a repeated game between the government (also called G
or policymaker), which applies energy taxes, and the private sector (called P or public)
which determines its energy consumption according to its expectations for government
energy policy.
Let E = (Eb;Es) be energy consumption variations with restrictions Eb;Es 2 [0;1]
and Eb +Es = 1. This means that, at each stage of the analysis, there is a positive
variation in the overall energy consumption.3 We ﬁrst deﬁne the government’s
preferences and then we consider those of the private sector.
2.1 The government’s energy preferences
The government implements its energy policy using taxes (or subsidies when taxes
are negative). We consider that the government’s policy is represented by couple
T = (Tb;Ts), where Tb and Ts represent taxes or subsidies on energy’s consumptions,
Tb;Ts 2 [¡1;1].
For the moment, we assume that Tb and Ts are the only policy instrument that G can
use to inﬂuence public consumption choices. By using its energy policy, G can draw
resources from energy consumptions. The revenue of G from energy consumptions is
assumed to be linear and represented by R=TbEb+TsEs. By substituting Eb by 1¡Es,
we obtain:
R = Tb+Es(Ts¡Tb): (1)
We assume that the government wishes to increase Es without R being below ¯ R >
0. Formally, G’s energy preferences can be represented by the following objective
function:
uG = R¡lG(1¡Es); (2)
in which constant lG ¸ 0 represents the priority that G gives to the alternative energy
with respect to energy taxation revenues. The government’s program is then
Max(Tb;Ts) R¡lG(1¡Es); s:c R ¸ ¯ R:
By substituting (1) in (2), we can rewrite the government’s objective function as
follows:
uG = EsTs+(Tb¡lG)(1¡Es): (3)
In Equation 3, the ﬁrst member represents the revenue from alternative energy
consumption. The second member refers to the base energy’s revenue which depends
not only on Tb but also on lG, the government’s preference for alternative energy.
2.2 The public’s energy preferences
The public utility function includes the public’s preference for alternative energy and
the expected overall cost related to energy consumption:
uP = lPEs¡cP: (4)
3 This amounts to assume that the public has increasing needs in energy at the moment of the analysis.
2in which constant lP ¸ 0 represents the weight that P gives to alternative energy




in which pb and ps(1+a) refer to energy prices, and (Te
s ;Te
b ) the government’s policy
expectedbythepublic. Parametera¸0representsthepotentialmonetarycontribution
(switching cost) to be made by the public for alternative energy consumption.4 In order
to simplify our calculations , we assume that pb = ps and prices are normalized to one











In this section, we determine time-consistent policies which constitute a Nash
equilibrium of the game described above. A Nash equilibrium includes the
government’s policy and the public’s energy consumption. Formally, a Nash
equilibrium is a couple (T;E), in which T = (Tb;Ts) is the government’s strategy
(taxes) and E = (Eb;Es) is the public’s strategy (energy consumptions).
An(expected)incentivegovernment’spolicyisapolicywhichincreasesalternative
energy consumption, i.e. a policy involving Es > 0.5 Denote by ˆ Te = ( ˆ Te
b ; ˆ Te
s ) an
incentive policy and by ˆ E = ( ˆ Eb; ˆ Es) the related energy consumption.
Proposition 1 ˆ Te = ( ˆ Te
b ; ˆ Te
s ) is an incentive for consuming the alternative energy if
a¡lP · ˆ Te
b ¡ ˆ Te
s : (8)
Proof: We must determine the set of Te = (Te
b ;Te
s ) such as Es > 0, i.e. the set of
(expected) incentive policies. Notice ﬁrst that with Es = 0 (the alternative energy con-
sumption is equal to zero),Up = ¡(1+Te
b ). As a result, an incentive policy is such as
Es > 0 involves Up ¸ ¡(1+Te
b ). The last inequality holds if lP¡(a+Te
s ¡Te
b ) ¸ 0,
i.e. if a¡lP · Te
b ¡Te
s . ¤
According to Condition (8) in Proposition 1, an incentive policy is such as the
tax differential (Te
b ¡Te
s ) is higher or equal to the energy switching cost (a¡lP).
Furthermore, by considering that a ¡ lP > 0 represents the most interesting and
relevant case, an incentive policy must verify Te
s < Te
b , as illustrated in Figure 1.
We turn now to the determination of credible energy policies. Such policies consist
in a subset of incentive policies. They are consistent with the government’s objective
function such as deﬁned in Eq. 3, meaning that they constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Credible policies are given by the inequality deﬁned in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let T¤ = (T¤
b ;T¤
s ) be an incentive policy for consuming the alternative
energy. Then T¤ = (T¤
b ;T¤
s ) is a time-consistent policy if T¤
b ¡T¤
s = lG.
4For instance a more costly standing charge in order to use green electricity.
5 It should be underlined that the degree of substitutability between the two energies does not modify
our ﬁnal results, even if it clearly changes the magnitude of the consumption variation of each energy.
For instance, in case of perfectly substitute energy sources, an incentive policy involves Es = 1.
3Figure 1: Incentive policies
Proof: We know that T¤ = (T¤
b ;T¤
s ) is an incentive policy if it satisﬁes condition
(8) in proposition 1, that is a¡lP ·T¤e
b¡T¤e
s. For such a policy to be time-consistent
it has also to maximize uG = EsTs+(Tb¡lG)(1¡Es). uG can be increased by means
of Es >0 whenever we have Tb¡lG ·Ts, i.e., Tb¡Ts ·lG (as assumed for the public,
government prefers alternative energy whenever indifferent). However, G attempts to
maximize its utility function and consequently it will restrict the last condition so as
Tb¡Ts = lG. ¤
Based on Proposition 2, a credible policy is deﬁned as an incentive policy for
both the public (refer to Condition (8)) and the government. The last condition is
fulﬁlled when the tax differential (T¤
b ¡T¤
s ) is equal to the government’s preference
for alternative energy (lG). Otherwise, there is an incentive for the government to
deviate from its early energy policy over time. Notice also that a credible policy may
fail to exist. This occurs when the switching cost is high enough to overcome the
government’s preference for alternative energy.
Consider now the interesting case in which the base energy tax has been previously
ﬁxed, and denoted by ¯ Tb. This means that government may only use alternative energy
tax as a policy tool. Then, from Proposition 2, we can draw the following result.
Corollary 1 Whenever ¯ Tb > lG, a credible policy implies Ts > 0.
Corollary 1 informs us that when the government’s preference for alternative energy
is lower than its base energy tax, then the only way to be credible implies setting
a positive tax on alternative energy, but not giving subsidies. This counter-intuitive
result will be illustrated in the next section.
4 Discussion
As described above, one interesting result that can be drawn from Proposition 2
(Corollary 1) relates to the impact of implementing Ts once determined Tb. As a
4Figure 2: Credible policies with a¡lP = 0 and lG = 0:2
result, we may compare situations in which the government draws different proceeds
from base energy. As expected, some aspects of the credible policy may be counter-
intuitive. In particular, when Tb exceeds lG, then all credible policies must apply a
positive Ts, meaning that an efﬁcient policy consists in taxing the alternative energy
instead of giving subsidies.
Consider the following example which is illustrated in Figure 2. We set a¡lP =0
and lG = 0:2. In such a case, we know that credible policies are located along straight
line lG = 0:2, which allows us to distinguish two subsets of credible policies: on the
up-side and down-side of lG. Regarding the ﬁrst one, a credible policy will consist
in ﬁxing a negative Ts (subsidies). For example, when Tb = 0:1, setting Ts = ¡0:1 is
a credible policy. On the contrary, in the second subset, all subsidies to alternative
energy will be considered as a time-inconsistent policy. For example, with Tb = 0:5
the alternative energy tax must be ﬁxed at 0:3.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the credibility issue for a government aiming at promoting
alternative energy. We have considered two sources of energy available to ﬁnal users:
a base energy (petroleum) and an alternative energy. We have shown that a credible
policy is such that (1) the switching cost for users is lower than the tax differential
between the two energy sources, and (2) this tax differential is equal to the government
preferenceforalternativeenergy. Asaresult, agovernment, whichhaspreviouslyﬁxed
a high base energy tax related to its preference for alternative energy, will be credible
by setting positive tax on alternative energy rather than subsidizing it.
At this stage of the analysis, it would be interesting to discuss the relationships
between credibility and energy vulnerability. Investments made for diversifying
sources of energy allow a government to reduce its energy vulnerability. As opposed to
5the intuitive result that reducing energy vulnerability could improve the credibility of
the government policy, the paper shows that developing alternative sources of energy is
not necessarily a credible approach for private agents. This result depends on strategic
interactions between the public and the government which are opponent for ﬁnancing
energy investments.
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